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aUniversity of Pretoria; bRadboud University
ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the first edition of Freud’s (1905b) “Three Essays on the
Theory of Sexuality” and more particularly the status of the perversions as it
appears in that book, demonstrating how this seminal text contains a radical
critique of a “psychiatric style of reasoning” (Davidson, 2001a) that turns the
perversions into a separate identity fundamentally different from other ‹iden-
tities›. Freud’s insights are then confronted with the Lacanian idea of a
“perverse structure.” It is argued that Lacan’s theories on perversion remain
deeply influenced by the French psychiatric tradition on the topic (Dupré,
1925) and that they imply a return to the “psychiatric style of reasoning” that
Freud tried to overcome. Finally, I formulate some suggestions with regard to
a re-thinking of sexuality in psychoanalytic metapsychology.
Introduction
From its inception psychoanalysis has presented and understood itself as a liberating theory and
practice. Freud and his pupils considered psychoanalysis, both in its theoretical and practical aspects,
an enterprise that could free us from all kinds of oppressive cultural norms, particularly with regard
to sexuality. Psychoanalysis was thought to be a threat to bourgeois sexual culture. Along the same
lines Lacan introduced the apocryphal story that while on their way to the United States in 1909,
Freud told Jung that they were bringing the plague to the New World (Roudinesco, 2014, p. 194).
Clearly, Lacan also saw psychoanalysis as a revolutionary movement with regard to the psychiatric
and cultural establishment. Contemporary psychoanalysts frequently repeat this pretense.
It is hard to deny that Freudian psychoanalysis in many respects had a liberating potential and that
psychoanalysis did contribute to profound changes in our cultural and moral landscape. Freud was, for
example, one of the first to de-pathologize homosexuality, and his ideas on (infantile) sexuality and on
sexual education testify to an attitude thatwas at oddswith the fundamental tendencies of his time.As iswell
known, the problem of the perversions plays a crucial role in this context. Nineteenth-century psychiatry
and sexology considered the sexual perversions exclusively as specific diagnostic entities that fit certain
patients and not others. Perversion was understood as a psychopathology alongside hysteria, neurasthenia,
andmultiple personality (Davidson, 2001a). For Freud, however, the perversions, like the other pathologies
that are central to his thought (i.e., hysteria, obsessional neurosis, and paranoia), have an anthropological
value. According to Freud, the different psychopathological categories inform us about the fundamental
tendencies and problematics that constitute human existence as such. This means, more concretely, that
with regard to our sexual existence the perversions show in a magnified way the building blocks that make
up the sexuality of every one of us. Freudian psychoanalysis is a patho-analysis (Van Haute and Geyskens,
2012). It takes psychopathology as a starting point for its anthropology and in doing so deconstructs the
problematic opposition between “normality” and pathology. According to Davidson this implies a radical
critique of what he calls “a psychiatric style of reasoning” (Davidson, 2001a, pp. 68–69).
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Nevertheless, Freud himself would turn away from the liberating potential of his own metapsychology.
Indeed, the reference to the Oedipus and castration complex introduced a more normalizing tendency to
his theories (Van Haute and Geyskens, 2012; Van Haute, 2014). This reference contradicts the patho-
analytic approach that at the same time remains present in many of Freud’s writings. Whatever the case
may be, the normalizing tendencies gained the upper hand in many post-Freudian writings and in
psychoanalytic practice. They are still dominant in many psychoanalytic quarters today (Tort, 2005,
pp. 423–434).
Freud (and with him many of his followers) seems to betray the radical and liberating aspects of
his own theory. As a result, psychoanalysis risks becoming a normalizing theory.1 It is impossible to
develop this problematic in all of its aspects and in relation to all the different psychoanalytic
traditions within the context of just one article. Hence, I limit myself in this article to the problem of
the status of the so-called perversions in the Freudian-Lacanian tradition.2 Indeed, the reference to
the problem of the perversions plays a foundational role in this tradition. Freud’s reflections on the
patho-analytic approach to human existence allows for a radical critique of the very idea of the
perversions as a legitimate psychopathological category. What is put into question is the very
legitimacy of differential diagnosis with regard to the perversions.3 I discuss this approach in the
first edition of the “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.” This first edition differs on crucial
points from the later editions we are familiar with and that were published in the Standard Edition
and in the “Gesammelte Werke.” It is particularly interesting and important for our discussion
because it doesn’t contain some of the normalizing concepts and theories (e.g., the developmental
perspective and the Oedipus complex) that were only introduced in the later editions.4
My argument is that references to a perverse structure that is popular in some Lacanian circles
seem to break with this patho-analytic approach. It re-introduces the very idea of a differential
“identity” Freud deconstructed. In doing so its adherents risk falling into all kinds of social and
moral prejudices that are subsequently presented as laws that structure sexuality (and society) as
such and that transcend history and the socio-cultural environments in which they occur. In this way
social and moral prejudices tend to be immunized from critique and in the process they acquire an
ideological status. I first discuss the Freudian approach to perversion and then contrast this approach
to Lacanian orthodoxy and more particularly the idea of a perverse structure. In my conclusion I
return to the historical and cultural context that might explain at least partially Lacan’s problematic
account of the perversions.
The pervert, my neighbor? The genesis of the sexual perversions and the Freudian
revolution
We all know the traditional list of perversions that was described in great detail by Krafft-Ebing and
other sexologists at the end of the 19th century: homosexuality, fetishism, sadomasochism, voyeurism,
and exhibitionism (Krafft-Ebing, 1965). Foucault, Davidson, and others have shown in the most
1In more recent times Jean Laplanche has no doubt been very attentive to this thematic (see, e.g., Laplanche, 2007). His theory of
a generalized seduction implies a ferocious critique of the developmental approach to psychoanalysis, the Oedipus complex, and
Lacan’s primacy of the phallus. In this way Laplanche tries to free psychoanalysis from its normalizing tendencies (Laplanche,
2007).
2In what follows I do not discuss the relation between homosexuality and psychoanalysis. This relation is and remains in many
ways very ambiguous and complicated (Dean and Lane, 2001). It is all too obvious that many psychoanalysts still defend highly
problematic positions on the topic. The recent debates in France among psychoanalysts on same-sex marriage, for example,
testify to this extremely conservative attitude. Analyzing the different positions and ideas on this issue would lead us too far
astray. For an overview see Roudinesco (2002).
3And more generally of differential diagnosis as such. When psycho-pathology informs us about who we are and shows the
fundamental tendencies and problematics that are operative in all of us, it becomes very difficult to think of the different
pathologies as independent “identities” that can be clearly distinguished from one another, let alone from an alleged “normality.”
4This first edition is in fact hard to find. There is no English translation of it available at present.
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convincing way that these perversions were not so much described for the first time in the second half
of the 19th century but were instead literally created in that period (Foucault, 1976; Davidson, 2001a).
These authors maintain that there were no perversions (and also no homo- or heterosexuality) before
the second half of the 19th century. They obviously do not mean that there was no perverse behavior
before this period (or that prior to this people would not have been interested in sex for that matter).
They claim, on the contrary, that these acts and activities were only from then on considered the
expression of a specific type of individual, a specific kind of subjective identity that shows itself, for
example, in particular character traits that are the result of a specific psychosexual history and
development (Foucault, 1976; Davidson, 2001a, p. 22ff.). Making reference to Ian Hacking one
could say that it is only from the second half of the 19th century onward that perversion becomes a
“possibility of personhood” (Hacking, 2002, p. 107). Davidson links this possibility to the development
of a “psychiatric style of reasoning” that determines its presuppositions. In this “style of reasoning,”
psychological explanations centered on the very notion of personality play an important role
(Davidson, 2001a, p. 63). From a historical perspective the psychiatric style of reasoning replaces an
anatomo-pathological style of reasoning. In this latter style, deviant behavior is consistently linked to
anatomical changes or to lesions in the neurological substratum. Hence, for instance, serious attempts
were made to link homosexuality to changes in the male organ (Davidson, 2001a, p. 6). It was thought,
for instance—the hypothesis turned out to be incorrect—that homosexuals would have a penis in the
shape of a corkscrew. There is insufficient space to discuss the whole history of 19th-century sexology
in all its juicy details, but it is all too clear that it is the absence of organic lesions (e.g., in the case of
homosexuality) that forced sexologists and psychiatrists to determine the perversions (but also, e.g.,
hysteria) as functional diseases. Or, more precisely, it is only at the very moment that sexuality is
defined as a function that like other functions can be disturbed without there being a specific organic
cause or neurological lesion that the perversions can be described as a separate category or class of
phenomena that intrinsically belong together (Davidson, 2001a).5 Only when sexuality is seen as a
(reproductive) function—and this is exactly the definition that Krafft-Ebing (1965) uses in the
beginning of Psychopathia Sexualis—can the different perversions be categorized under one label as
the different disorders of this function. Only from this point on does a “perverse (psychological)
identity” that is essentially different from other “identities” become possible.
All of these developments belong to the context in which Freud articulates his insights on human
sexuality and its role in psychopathology. I limit my discussion of Freud to the first edition of the
“Three Essays” (Freud, 1905a,b),6 which is fundamentally different from the later editions that were
published in 1910, 1915, 1920, and 1924. In this first edition there is, for instance, no reference to the
Oedipus and the castration complexes. In this first version the idea of a progressive psychic
development is also almost completely absent. These theories were only introduced in the later
editions (Van Haute, 2014). It is already clear from this that the first edition of the “Three Essays”
differs in many respects from what is often assumed to be characteristic of Freudian theory (Van
Haute and Westerink, 2016). But one thing does not change in the subsequent editions of the text:
Freud’s starting point. As is well known, the first part of the text discusses the “sexual aberrations,”
that is, the different perversions as they had been defined (mainly) by Krafft-Ebing (1965). It is with
these “aberrations” that Freud begins (Freud, 1905a, p. 1ff., 1905b, p. 135ff.). The importance of this
gesture should be immediately evident. The sexologists at the end of the 19th and beginning of the
20th century took the supposedly normal (reproductive) functioning of sexuality as their starting
point. From there it became possible to define the perversions as deviations of this function. Freud,
on the other hand, calls the very idea of sexuality as a reproductive function a “poetic fable” (Freud,
1905a, p. 2, 1905b, p. 136), and he literally turns the argumentation of his fellow sexologists upside
5For a critical assessment of this historical account of sexuality and perversion, see Mazaleigue (2014).
6I only thematize the first edition. I quote from both the German 1905 edition (Freud, 1905a) and the 1924 edition that one finds
in the Standard Edition (Freud, 1905b).
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down: to understand sexuality we should start not from a supposedly “normal” function but from
what we consider “deviations” of this function. Indeed, according to Freud, these deviations—the
classical “perversions”—show us the constitutive elements of sexuality as such. This means, more
concretely, that the different perversions reveal the building blocks of human sexuality in an isolated
and magnified way. Sadism confronts us, for instance, with an instinct for mastery that belongs to
sexuality as such and that otherwise might pass unnoticed (Freud, 1905a).
It is hard to overestimate the consequences of this patho-analytic turn. Indeed, Freud connects this
insight immediately with the idea that sexuality has no object that is ascribed to it by nature (and,
furthermore, that the drives only tend toward pleasure; Freud, 1905a, p. 10, 1905b, pp. 147–148). The
starting point of the sexologists is therefore nothing but a chimera. Bearing in mind what was said
before regarding Foucault and Davidson, all of this implies that from the outset Freud rejects the very
conditions for the existence of the perversions as a separate identity, a separate “possibility of
personhood.” If sexuality cannot be understood as a natural function, if sexuality can, moreover,
only be understood from the perspective of its so-called deviations, then it inevitably becomes
impossible to classify a group of people as “perverts,” which, from a psychological point of view,
would be to make a fundamental distinction between a group who escape “perversion” and another
who do not. Davidson concludes from this that Freud breaks away from the psychiatric style of
reasoning as it was defined earlier in this article (Davidson, 2001a, p. 71).
The different perversions inform us about the different building blocks of sexuality. What Freud
learns from them is that sexuality is constructed out of partial drives (oral, anal…) that find their locus
in the corresponding erogenous zones. These partial drives only pursue pleasure and are fundamen-
tally autoerotic—this means that they do not aim at an object or, more precisely, that their relation to
any and every object has no essential meaning. It is exclusively the capacity of the object to provide
pleasure that is at stake here (Freud, 1905a, p. 37, 1905b, p. 181). The different erogenous zones—and
this is absolutely crucial—are not situated in a chronological (or teleological) sequence. There is one
passage in the 1905 edition of the “Three Essays” that seems to contradict this idea. This is where Freud
writes with respect to infantile genital masturbation, from which hardly anyone escapes, that it is in
line with “Nature’s purpose” (‘die Absicht der Natur’) to prepare the genital zone for the determining
role it will have to play in later life (Freud, 1905a, p. 42). When confronted in 1912 by a member of the
famous Wednesday evening meetings with the fact that this would introduce a teleological motive to
his texts and that nothing prepared for such a motive, Freud immediately gave in and changed his text
accordingly (Freud, 1905b, p. 188). From the edition of 1915 onward, the reference to “Nature’s
purpose” is left out.7 Sexuality has no natural object and, even more radically, there cannot be a
primacy of the genital zone that is grounded in the nature of sexuality either. Freud is much more
radical thanmany of our contemporary psychoanalysts: he not only maintains that we all have perverse
fantasies8 but also, and this is more fundamental, he deconstructs the essential presuppositions that
would allow us to identify a separate category of so-called sexual perverts.
This is what Freud says in 1905. Or, rather, this is what Freud says in the first two chapters of the
1905 edition of the “Three Essays.”9 In the third chapter entitled “Transformations of Puberty”
Freud seems to defend a completely different position. Here, for instance, Freud writes the following:
Writers on the subject … have asserted that the necessary precondition of a whole number of perverse fixations
lies in an innate weakness of the sexual instinct. In this form the view seems to me untenable. It makes sense,
however, if what is meant is a constitutional weakness of one particular factor in the sexual instinct, namely the
7Starting with the 1915 edition the passage reads as follows: “It is scarcely possible to avoid the conclusion that the foundations
for the future primacy over sexual activity exercised by this erotogenic zone are established by early infantile masturbation,
which scarcely a single individual escapes” (Freud, 1905d, p. 188).
8One finds this interpretation of Freud’s theories in texts of the most well-informed and intelligent psychoanalysts. See, for
example, Florence (2005).
9The introduction of a developmental approach together with the introduction of the Oedipus complex in later versions fundamen-
tally changes Freud’s perspective and introduces a normalizing approach. It is beyond the scope of this article to develop an
account of these changes. For a more detailed account see Van Haute (2014) and Van Haute and Westerink (2016).
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genital zone—a zone which takes over the function of combining the separate sexual activities for the purposes
of reproduction. For if the genital zone is weak, this combination, which is required to take place in puberty, is
bound to fail, and the strongest of other components of sexuality will continue its activity as a perversion
[Freud 1905a, p. 75, 1905b, p. 237].
How can we reconcile this statement with what Freud has already claimed in the first two chapters of the
book under consideration? From a historical point of view it is patently obvious that the sexologists to
whom Freud is referring said exactly the same thing as what Freud himself is proposing, namely, that
perversion must be linked to a weakness of the genital zone (Davidson, 2001a, p. 89). But this quotation
implies a teleological and functional view of sexuality, which was precisely the view that Freud sought to
reject in the first two chapters of the book. Davidson is therefore quite justified in stating that in light of
his own argumentation Freud could only have said the following:
For if the genital zone is weak, this combination which often takes place at puberty [instead of “which is required to
take place in puberty”… this indeed implies a functional/teleological interpretation] will fail, and the strongest of the
other components of sexuality will continue its activity [instead of “will continue its activity as a perversion” … the
latter implies that there exists a “pervert identity” that can be described as such] [Davidson, 2001a, p. 89].
The perverse structure
Let us now turn to Lacan and his followers in order to consider the way in which they rethink the status
of the sexual perversions. My aim here is neither to analyze the totality of Lacan’s texts nor to give a
detailed account of everything Lacan wrote on the perversions, which, in fact, was not that much.
Rather I limit myself to the idea of a perverse structure, which is very popular in many Lacanian circles
and which is supposed to be essentially different from the neurotic and psychotic structures (Fink,
1997; Verhaeghe, 2001, 2004; Swales, 2012; Bonny and Maleval, 2015). According to Verhaeghe, the
theory of the different structures of the subject is generally accepted in contemporary Lacanian theory
(Verhaeghe, 2001, p. 77). Although this idea is undoubtedly based on some of Lacan’s most funda-
mental assumptions,10 it would nevertheless be unjust to reduce his thinking on this topic to the idea
that perversion, or the perverse structure as it is often called, is essentially different from the other two
structures just mentioned. Lacan cannot be reduced to the textbook versions of his thinking. Hence, in
his famous text Kant with Sade Lacan tries to understand the basic characteristics of human desire as
such from the perspective of sadism and, more particularly, the work of Sade himself (Lacan, 1966).
Lacan here defends a patho-analytic approach that makes it impossible to reduce “sadism” to a specific
perversion next to other perversions. Sadism is in this text not exclusively interpreted “next and in
opposition to” the other positions. On the contrary, the work of Sade shows, according to Lacan, the
impasses of Kant’s philosophy and in doing so it allows for the discovery of some fundamental aspects
of human desire. There is no place here to give a detailed reading of this difficult text, but it is clear that
in it Lacan seems to follow a patho-analytic approach. This approach characterizes, as we already
know, Freud’s early texts and it goes against the idea of pathological “identities” that are essentially
different from other pathological “identities.” Lacan’s thinking on (the status of) the different struc-
tures is, in other words, much less univocal than is sometimes suggested.
But what does this theory of the subjective structures about which there seems to be a general
agreement entail? In order to get a clearer idea of this theory, it is worthwhile focusing a little more on
Verhaeghe and the way in which he thematizes the perversions in his well-known book on differential
diagnosis in psychoanalysis (Verhaeghe, 2004). Indeed, Verhaeghe’s account of the perversions makes
explicit a paradigm that could be said to underlie a number of other Lacanian publications on the same
topic (Dor, 1987; Miller, 1996; Fink, 1997; Feher, 2003; Lebrun, 2007). Like these other authors,
10“The whole problem of the perversions consists in conceiving how the child in relation to the mother, a relation constituted in
analysis not by his vital dependence on her, but by his dependence on her love, that is to say, by the desire of her desire,
identifies himself with the imaginary object of this desire in as far as the mother herself symbolizes it in the phallus” (Lacan,
1977, pp. 197–198).
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Verhaeghe refers in his introduction to the chapter on the perversions to Freud’s “Three Essays.” He
mentions Freud’s insight that human sexuality is essentially polymorph perverse and that the predis-
position to perversion is present in all of us. He then concludes as follows: “Consequently, according to
Freudian theory, the distinction between perverse traits and the perverse structure is not easy to make”
(Verhaeghe, 2004, p. 403). It is immediately clear that this citation contradicts Freud’s patho-analytic
perspective that I explained earlier in this article. This citation can indeed be rendered as follows: “Of
course, we all have more or less perverse tendencies, and perverse fantasies are quite common … but
these are irrelevant with regard to an essentially neurotic, psychotic, or perverse structure; the real
‘perversion’ is situated elsewhere.” It is worth recalling that the distinction between perverse traits and
perversion proper in some ways resonates with a similar distinction that can be found in the work of
Krafft-Ebing and other psychiatrists of the 19th century. Krafft-Ebing (1965) calls perverse transgressions
in the context of nonsexual pathologies “perversities” in otherwise “healthy” people (Perversitäten). The
latter are vices that have to be judged from amoral or a juridical point of view. Perversitäten are licentious
acts committed by people who could do otherwise but who prefer forbidden pleasures to that which the
law considers “normal” or “good.” As a point of principle, these “perverse acts” are judged immoral and
they often warrant punishment. They have to be strictly distinguished from perversion (Perversion) as a
disease that “overrules” the free will and that concerns the whole personality—hence fromperversion as a
“possibility of personhood.”11 It is worth noting that just like contemporary Lacanian authors, Krafft-
Ebing considers “perversion” not only as a distinct type of identity but also as an incurable one at that.
Once a pervert, always a pervert!
Rather than reaching a conclusion too hastily, it is worthwhile asking what characterizes the
perverse structure according to the authors under consideration. Essentially Lacan and his followers
link perversion to a specific type of relation to (the Other of) the law.12 Perversion is fundamentally
identified with a specific relation to the Law of language that introduces lack (or as Lacan puts it,
castration) and in doing so makes desire possible. This law is also the law of the father that forbids the
mother to take the child as an object that might allow her to overcome her own lack in enjoyment
(“jouissance”). Hence, it comes as no surprise that one seeks the origin of the perverse structure in the
relation to the first Other—in principle the mother. The perverse subject, so we are indeed told, is stuck
in a relation to the first Other in which he is reduced to a phallic object thereby (fantasmatically)
allowing her to overcome her lack. In other words, the child is here nothing but the imaginary phallus
of the Other (Lacan, 1977, pp. 197–198). The father (i.e., the law that he represents) is at the same time
reduced to a spectator without any power or importance. Hence, castration is both denied (in the
mother who is supposed to be able to overcome lack in the relation with her child) and recognized (in
the powerless father). Lacan here generalizes the defense mechanism that according to Freud char-
acterizes fetishism in such a way that it now applies to all the perversions. This defense mechanism is
disavowal (Freud, 1927). This mechanism implies that the subject takes a double stance: it both
acknowledges and denies castration (Verhaeghe, 2004, p. 411).
This situation confronts the child with a paradox that is, according to our authors, at the basis of the
perverse structure and explains its logic. The little child is on the one hand the object that makes the
enjoyment of the Other possible, but on the other hand this state of affairs excludes the development of a
separate identity. Indeed, as long as the “infans” remains nothing but the object that fills the lack of the
Other, it cannot develop a desire of its own. The child tries to overcome this paradoxical situation by
turning itself—actively—into the instrument of the enjoyment of the Other. He is at the service of the
enjoyment of the Other in the possibility of which he continues to firmly believe. The enjoyment of the
Other is the goal of all his hard work. This would explain, for instance, why perverse subjects so often
claim that the victims of their acts “also enjoy it” or “asked for it themselves” (Verhaeghe, 2004, p. 425).
11“Perversion of the sexual instinct… is not to be confounded with perversity in the sexual act; since the latter may be induced by
conditions other than psychopathological. The concrete perverse act, monstrous as it may be, is clinically not decisive. In order to
differentiate between disease (perversion) and vice (perversity), one must investigate the whole personality of the individual and
the original motive leading to the perverse act. Therein will be found the key to the diagnosis” (Krafft-Ebing, 1965, p. 53).
12For what follows see, for example, Verhaeghe (2004, pp. 397–427) and Swales (2012).
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The perverse subject, so much is clear, identifies with the object that allows him to overcome lack once
and for all. This also implies that the perverse subject does not accept the law of castration and lack. But
the enjoyment of the Other would inevitably imply his own disappearance as a desiring subject. There is
no desiring subject outside of lack and castration. Hence, the possibility of the enjoyment of the Other
provokes anxiety. This anxiety forces the subject to limit enjoyment and hence to introduce a law after all
(the masochist, e.g., submits himself to the Other and turns himself into the object of his enjoyment, but
at the same time hemakes sure not to lose control of the situation and sets a limit).13 But this law can only
be the law of the perverse subject itself because it belongs to the very structure of perversion to challenge
the law of the Other (of the father, who introduces castration). The consequences of this challenge are
that the Other is either reduced to a powerless spectator or systematically ridiculed. One can think here of
the writings of Sade, who “teaches” the passive Other (those who read his books) about what “real
enjoyment” is and how it radically differs from our petty (“neurotic”) pleasures. One sees the difference
between the perverse and the neurotic position. In the latter case castration is acknowledged and the child
accepts that neither he nor the father can satisfy the desire of the mother. Here the central question with
regard to sexuality becomes, Am I doing well? We are far away here from Sade’s writings (Verhaeghe,
2004, p. 436).
Although hardly complete, this description must suffice to indicate what is at stake here. In the first
place, Lacan is no longer concerned with the types of sexual behavior (fetishistic, sadist) that can be
linked to a specific identity. These types of behavior can occur in every structure. Lacan is, on the
contrary, much more interested in a structural relation to the law (of the Other). This is what the idea
of a perverse structure is about. The notion of a perverse structure implies that this relation char-
acterizes a specific group of people in a consistent and invariable way. Hence, we are talking of a kind of
identity or psychological profile (the “pervert”) that no longer threatens human sexuality but human
society as such (Dean, 2008). The law that the pervert refuses (the law of the father, of castration …
sexual difference) is indeed supposed to be the law that founds human society. This law (“no”) of the
father (that separates us from the first Other) inherently refers to the interdiction of incest or to the
obligation of exogamy (and hence to the law of sexual difference) that, according to Lacan, founds
human society. As a consequence the perverse subject doesn’t question this or that specific law. On the
contrary, it actively subverts the order of legality as such.14 This probably explains, second, why the
qualification “pervert” is consistently and enthusiastically applied outside the strictly sexual sphere
while the classical sexual perversions at the same time (usually with the exception of homosexuality15)
continue to be used as the paradigms of perversion. Indeed, the law that the perverse subject refuses (or
denies) is in the last instance structurally linked to (the law of) sexual difference (Feher, 2003).16 In this
way the classical sexual perversions continue to play a pivotal role in the context I discuss here. Third,
these perversions are—just as in the past—both implicitly and explicitly qualified in a negative way.We
find this negative qualification both in the clinical context and in theoretical writings. Verhaeghe, for
instance, writes that the perversions are close to psychopathy, and he describes perverse subjects as
“potential perpetrators.”17 Verhaeghe indeed writes that we find a generalized clinical picture of the
perverse structure in forensic practice (Verhaeghe, 2004, p. 405ff.).18 This should not come as a
surprise given that perversion is defined in the first place in terms of a defying relation to the law.
13This is why Lacan calls the perversion a “père-version.”
14Stephanie Swales writes in this respect: “The perverse subject is he who has undergone alienation but disavowed castration,
suffering from excessive jouissance and a core belief that the law and social norms are fraudulent at worse and weak at best”
(Swales, 2012, p. xii).
15The attitude of many Lacanian psychoanalysts with regard to homosexuality remains quite ambiguous. For a more detailed
account of this problematic see Roudinesco (2002) and Tort (2005).
16Indeed, the pervert presents himself as the object that can fulfill the lack of the Other and in doing so denies sexual difference.
He is a “hommosexual” (Lacan, 1973, p. 78).
17“The fine line between victim and perpetrator is often transgressed …” (Verhaeghe, 2004, p. 429).
18For example, Verhaeghe writes, “In the conventional world, the law will apparently be followed, that is to say the pervert acts on
the assumption that others will follow the conventional rules and he or she will make full use of this knowledge” (Verhaeghe,
2004, p. 412). In a footnote to this passage he adds, “The association with the old psychopathy is quite clear.”
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This negative attitude toward “the pervert” runs through the work of other Lacanian authors who
appear to exhibit no sympathy whatsoever for the kind of people they call “perverts.” Thus, for
instance, Feher writes that nobody “in his right mind” would call himself “a pervert” (Feher, 2004,
p. 191). She not only claims that nobody sympathizes with perverts but also that “the strange world
of perverse logic” (Feher, 2003, p. 205) should only be mistrusted and that queer theory, which is its
cultural representative, should be therefore rejected (Feher, 2003, pp. 203–204).19 This negative
attitude hardly comes as a surprise when we realize that the perversions were first defined as a direct
threat to the very existence of human society. Insofar as the traditional perversions continue to have
a paradigmatic value within the so-called perverse structure, their negative qualification (and the
rejection that this implies) remains intact (or is re-instated).20 We are confronted here with an
ambiguity that is hard to resolve: on the one hand the problem of perversion cannot be limited to
that of the “sexual aberrations” while on the other hand the latter continues to be its most preferred
paradigm. In this way the classical sexual perversions continue to participate in the negative
reputation that accompanies perversions and that Freud (but also Krafft-Ebing) wanted to
overcome.21 We are far removed here from Freud’s initial intuitions.
I suggested earlier that Lacanian theorists tend to reintroduce the idea of a “perverse identity.” In
doing so I obviously wanted to indicate that the way in which these theorists thematize “subjective
positions” might signal a regressive shift back to the psychiatric style of reasoning that Freud, at least
initially, rejected for the reasons already outlined. One could of course object that 19th-century sexology
took its starting point in an allegedly “normal” sexual function and that Lacan and the Lacanians of
whom I speak do not accept a “normal” position or structure next to a perverse or neurotic one. But
things might be more complicated than they seem. The three structures that are distinguished in
Lacanian theory are evidently not at the same level. Put in a brutal way, we could say that there exists
a neurotic next to a psychotic position and then there are “potential perpetrators.” The perverse structure
is time and again evaluated in a negative way in relation to the two other structures. But that is not all—at
the same time the neurotic position or structure tends to be described as the “normal” one. There are
many examples that illustrate this tendency. Verhaeghe speaks of a “normal-neurotic context”
(Verhaeghe, 2004, p. 335), and he further calls the psychoanalyst “normal-neurotic” (Verhaeghe, 2002,
p. 352). In this way Verhaeghe implicitly turns the neurotic structure or position into the standard for a
“better way of living.”Along similar lines, Fink writes of a perverse patient that there is “little hope” (sic!)
that he will ever become neurotic. Citing Freud’s essay “The Splitting of the Ego” (Freud, 1940), the same
author adds the term “neurotic” between brackets after “normal” to a quote where Freud speaks of the
“normal consequences of castration anxiety” (Fink, 1997, p. 197). Thus, despite appearances, these
Lacanian authors—in a much more systematic way then Lacan himself—clearly betray Freudian patho-
analysis. Perversion no longer informs us about sexuality as such but is reduced to a particular
(pathological) structure next to other structures. This specific structure does not in principle have
anything to teach us about human desire as such.
Conclusion
The Freudian deconstruction of “normality” turned perversion into a universal human condition.
Specifically, it made it impossible to present perversion as a separate (psychological) identity. From a
Freudian perspective one could say that because everybody is “perverse,” nobody can be a pervert in
the sense of an identity that is essentially different from other identities. The perverse subject, in
19Judith Feher clearly has no idea about what “informal fallacies” are.
20We should indeed remember that classical sexology tried to get rid of these negative qualifications by claiming that the
perversions were mental diseases and escaped our free will. The consequence of this is that pervert subjects deserve our help
and attention, not rejection.
21Stephanie Swales, whom I already quoted (see footnote 14), is a perfect example of this. On the one hand she defines the
perverse subject as somebody for whom the law is fraudulent while at the same time—and under the same “heading”—giving a
very detailed account of the different sexual perversions (Swales, 2012).
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other words, is not just an “other” with whom I have nothing in common. Of course, this does not
mean that for Freud in sexualibus “anything goes.” On the contrary, Freud links the different partial
drives in his “Three Essays” to “reaction-formations”—basically shame and disgust (but he also
mentions guilt, for example)—that put limits to our innate perverse tendencies (Freud, 1905a, p. 35,
1905b, p. 151ff.). These “reaction-formations” are the starting point for the development of cultural
prohibitions and obligations with regard to sexuality. Hence, for Freud there is no sexuality without
limits and without conflict. But the laws we make with regard to it cannot, without great difficulty,
be linked to a supposed “nature” of sexuality. They are essentially historical and contingent and
hence subject to criticism and debate (Van Haute and Westerink, 2016).
From this Freudian point of view, thinking in terms of psychopathological positions threatens to be
inevitably anachronistic. Perversions become once again identities—indeed, identities of a despicable
nature—that are essentially different from other “identities.” The fact that the (universal) “perverse
traits” are no longer rejected as morally bad and inadmissible is no real consolation because it is now
the pathological state itself that is systematically judged in a negative way or that tends to be qualified as
intrinsically “bad” or “evil.” This is at least paradoxical. The history of 19th-century psychiatry and
sexology can in a certain way be summarized as a permanent (and largely unsuccessful?)22 attempt to
separate psychiatric scientific thinking from moral and religious prejudices on the basis of which we
consider different kinds of sexual practices “bad” or “morally wrong.” This is precisely the reason
Kraft-Ebbing, for instance, separates “perversities” that are morally reprehensible from “perversions”
that are mental illnesses. Freud still goes one step further by “deconstructing” the very idea of
“perversion” as a separate identity and by turning it into a universal human disposition. In the
Lacanian tradition these two aspects risk becoming conflated once again.23 What characterizes the
perversions is precisely a structurally twisted and defiant relation to the law that founds human society.
And once perversion is characterized as the systematic undermining of the laws of society as such, one
should not find it too surprising that the perversions quite often evoke a (violent) moral rejection.
The Lacanian perversion—the idea of a “perverse structure”—seems to participate in a universe
that is not exactly the same as the one that determines Freud’s ideas on perversion. We are used to
think of Lacan and Lacanian theory in terms of a “return to Freud.” But can we properly understand
this theory—especially with regard to the perversions—without taking the French psychiatric tradi-
tion into account in which Lacan was educated as a psychiatrist? Or, more concretely, isn’t Lacan
with regard to the perversions a pupil of Ernest Dupré rather than a pupil of Krafft-Ebing (and
consequently of Freud)? Dupré influenced in a hegemonic fashion French psychiatry with regard to
the problem of the perversions until at least 1960 (Lantéri-Laura, 2012, pp. 129–137; Mazaleigue,
2014). Dupré belongs to the generation of de Clérambault—whom Lacan called his “master in
psychiatry”—whose influence on Lacanian thinking also remains insufficiently studied. As I don’t
have enough space here to give a detailed account of the relation between Lacan (the idea of a
perverse structure) and Dupré I limit myself to formulating the outlines of a hypothesis.
In spite of the important differences that separate Lacan and Dupré, there are some troubling
similarities that deserve our attention. It is true that Dupré desexualizes the perversions even more
then Lacan does. In his work the sexual perversions no longer function as a paradigm of perversion in
general. They are nothing but one species among others (perversions of the instinct of conservation and
of the instinct of association (Dupré, 1925). Dupré furthermore postulates an innate perverse constitu-
tion that in the end is nothing else than a tendency to inflict harm and do wrong (or to prefer what is bad
over what is good (Dupré, 1925, p. 419; Lantéri-Laura, 2012, p. 133). Obviously a (perverse) structure
cannot be identified to a constitution in the biologist sense of the word as in the work of Dupré. But one
can wonder whether the former isn’t its reversed mirror image. Of course, the perverse structure isn’t
22Lacan’s theory of the perversions should in this respect be re-contextualized from the perspective of the history of psychiatric
thinking on the topic. For more on this problem, see Mazaleigue (2014, p. 290).
23“Perverse traits” that occur in neurotic and psychotic structures are no longer seen as intrinsically problematic or morally “wrong”
as in Krafft-Ebing (1965). It may not be unfair to say that for the Lacanian authors under consideration they are nothing but
“sexual frivolities” that do not deserve further attention.
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innate in the sameway asDupré’s biological constitution is. But its genesis goes so far back that it tends to
transcend historical time (Lantéri-Laura, 2012, p. 167). This explains its immutable and undeclinable
(uncurable) character that it shares with a biological constitution. On top of that, the perverse structure is
explicitly linked—as is the perverse constitution, although for different reasons—to psychopathia and
hence to the problem of evil. It follows from this that the perverse structure essentially transcends
sexuality, even if at the same time it cannot be understood as separate from it in Lacan, for the reasons I
explained before. Although this hypothesis is still tentative, Lantéri-Laura’s conclusion certainly no
longer comes as a surprise: “The notion of a perverse structure… (assures), 40 years after Dupré, exactly
the same role as that of constitution, and also in order to re-install a neo-moralism”24 (Lantéri-Laura,
2012, p. 185, my translation).
However, we cannot understand this regressive movement by simply referring to the historical back-
ground of Lacanian thinking. There are in my opinion at least two more elements that need mentioning
here. First of all—and despite appearances—the Lacanian authors under discussion reject the patho-
analytic perspective that I have argued is intrinsically linked to a deconstruction of perverse identity.
A second reason might be even more interesting, at least from a philosophical point of view. Partly as a
consequence of Lacan’s work, it has become customary to think about sexuality from the perspective of
sexual difference. But is it possible to think about sexuality in this way without being at the same time (and
for the same reason) heteronormative? This would mean disqualifying or subordinating “positions” in
which sexual difference is denied to positions in which it is supposed not to be. In the first edition of the
“Three Essays,” Freud does not thematize sexuality from the perspective of sexual difference so much as
from the perspective of nonfunctional bodily pleasures.25 The perversions are thought to be strange ways of
procuring oneself bodily pleasures, but there is no intrinsic principle that allows one to subordinate one
form of pleasure to another form of pleasure. In Lacan, on the contrary, what characterizes the perverse
subject is not somuch the bodily pleasures the subject is looking for but the twisted and transgressive way in
which the subject relates to the law.26 Lacan does not define perverse enjoyment in terms of bodily pleasures
but, for instance, in terms of the anxiety it provokes in the Other (Lacan, 2004).
It is the thematization of sexuality in terms of bodily pleasures, together with the patho-analytic
perspective, that makes a deconstruction of perversion as a separate identity both possible and
necessary. In this way my journey through the problematic of the perversions ends (at least
provisionally) where it started: with Foucault. Indeed, it does not require too much imagination to
discover Foucault’s “corps des plaisirs” in Freud’s sexual pleasures (Davidson, 2001b). Perhaps for
the moment we should therefore conclude that if psychoanalysis is to remain true to Freud’s most
important insights then it will be a Foucauldian enterprise.
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